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DUE PROCESS RIGHTS AND HIGH SCHOOL
SUSPENSIONS AFTER GOSS v. LOPEZ
Karen S. Townsend*
INTRODUCTION
Judicial interposition in the operation of the public school system
of the Nation raises problems requiring care and restraint. . . By
and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the
control of state and local authorities. Courts do not and cannot
intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily
operation of school systems and which do not directly and sharply
implicate basic constitutional values.'
Despite this judicial admonition, and over a vigorous dissent
which forecast the adverse effect the decision would have on the
quality of education, the United States Supreme Court held in Goss
v. Lopez that:
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that a student facing temporary suspensions from a public school
be given oral or written notice of the charges against him and, if
he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his version.'
With this decision, the conflicting holdings of circuit and federal
district courts as to the applicability of the due process clause to
short suspensions from public schools were resolved. 3
It will be the purpose of this note to examine the background
of the Goss decision, to discuss its holding and implications, and to
explore its impact on Montana schools.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The question of which procedural due process protections are
extended to a high school student threatened with a temporary
suspension is but one part of "an extremely vague and confusing
area" of the law known as student rights.4 Although the Supreme
Court has held that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the
* Prior to becoming a law student, Karen Townsend had six and a half years' teaching
and counseling experience in public high schools in Hawaii and Montana. She holds a M.A.
in Counseling Psychology from the University of California.
1. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
2. Goes v. Lopez, - U.S. _ 95 S.Ct. 729 (1975).
3. See generally, cases cited in footnote 8 of Goss v. Lopez, supra note 2 at 737-738.
4. See generally, STRousE, JEAN., Up AGAjNsT THE LAw. THE LEGAL RIGHs OF PEOPLE
UNDER 21. (New American Library 1970).
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Bill of Rights is for adults alone"' 5 and also that: "It can hardly be
argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate,"'
"the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for affirming the
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consis-
tent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and
control conduct in the schools." 7 This recognition by the Court of
the authority of school officials has limited the:
rights of the young in whatever ways judges can be persuaded are
necessary to let the family and the school carry out their tasks, and
generally speaking, the law in this county has allowed adults to
draw the limits to the rights of the young very narrowly.'
A series of important court decisions handed down since 1961 has,
however, established certain minimum procedural due process
guidelines. Although the high school student being disciplined may
not take advantage of all the constitutional safeguards provided for
the adult criminal defendant, his right to minimum protections has
been recognized.
A. Pre-1961
The earlier cases challenging procedures used by school admin-
istrators in suspensions or expulsions were brought by college stu-
dents against the dean, president, or governing board of their alma
mater. Prior to 1961, these university administrators had a free
hand in the disciplinary process. If an infraction occurred, usually
a private session with the dean rather than a formal hearing before
some administrative board sufficed on the general theory that such
a procedure spared the misbehaving student adverse publicity and
the counseling that went on in such a session was part of the overall
educational process of the university. The injection of any due pro-
cess requirements into this process was seen as creating an adver-
sarial relationship which was antithetical to the counseling relation-
ship?
There was, in addition, a general reluctance shown by courts to
interfere in these matters for two primary reasons. First the univer-
sity or college was seen as acting in loco parentis. Since courts would
not step into the disciplinary process between parent and child, they
5. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
6. Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1968).
7. Id. at 507
8. Ladd, Edward T., Civil Liberties for Students-At What Age? 3 J. L.&ED. 251, 252
(April, 1974).
9. See generally, O'Toole, George A. Jr., Summary Suspension of Students Pending a
Disciplinary Hearing: How Much Process is Due?, 1 J. L.&ED. 383, 383-384 (July, 1972).
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could not step in between dean and student. Second, the courts
viewed these questions as purely internal affairs of the university,
and thus unfit for judicial determination. This attitude was re-
flected in court approval of dismissals where there had been no
hearing at all, or where the hearing was challenged as insufficient
or unfair.'"
Typical of these pre-1961 cases is the 1928 Montana case of
State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp.'I In this case, a married woman, who
was an honor student, was suspended from the state university at
Missoula. She and her husband, also a student, allegedly held par-
ties where liquor was served in their home, without a chaperone
approved by the Dean of Women. One particular party allegedly
occurred after the annual Barristers' Ball. The Montana Supreme
Court held that Mrs. Ingersoll was not entitled to a hearing and
notice of the charges against her."
In a case decided one year later, the Ingersoll case was cited as
standing for the proposition:
That the courts will not interfere with the discretion of school
officials in matters which the law has conferred to their judgment,
unless there is a clear abuse of that discretion, or arbitrary or
unlawful action. .... 13
B. The Dixon Case and Its Impact
Judicial deference to the university's sense of fair play ended
with the 1961 Fifth Circuit decision of Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education.4 The Dixon case held that a public university
must notify a student in writing of the precise charge against him
and provide him with the opportunity for a fair hearing that would
meet certain requirements before he could be expelled. 5 The case
found that the student's interest in his continued education,
whether a right or a privilege, was an important one, and the Four-
teenth Amendment required the university to act in accordance
with the principles of due process when it threatened to harm that
interest."
10. Id. For example see: Dehaan v. Brandeis University, 150 F. Supp. 626 (D. Mass.
1957); People ex rel. Bleutt v. Board of Trustees, 10 Ill. App.2d 207, 134 N.E.2d 635 (1956);
Barker v. Bryn Mawr College, 272 Pa. 121, 122 A. 220 (1923).
11. State ex rel Ingersoll v. Clapp, 81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433, cert. den. 277 U.S. 591,
error dismd. 278 U.S. 661 (1928).
12. Id. at 215-216.
13. Kelsey v. School District No. 25, 84 Mont. 453, 276 P. 26, 27 (1929).
14. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961); cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
15. O'Toole, supra note 9 at 385.
16. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, supra note 14 at 156.
1975]
3
Townsend: Due Process Rights And High School Suspensions After Goss v. Lopez
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1975
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
The test of due process used in the Dixon case was the test
articulated in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint
Anti Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath." By applying the
Frankfurter test that the government's interest be balanced against
the interest of the affected individual in Dixon, the Court concluded
that there were no compelling reasons for not "exercising at least the
fundamental principles of fairness by giving the accused students
notice of the charges and an opportunity to be heard in their own
defense. " ,1
Following the Dixon case, the lower federal courts uniformly
held the due process clause applicable to decisions to remove a
student from a public educational institution for a period of time
long enough to be classified as an expulsion.'9 Some of these deci-
sions raised the issue of the applicability of due process at the high
school level and held that the same requirements must be followed
at the local high school when the penalty being imposed was expul-
sion.20 The question of that clause's applicability to the short sus-
pension was, however, undecided until the decision in Goss v.
Lopez.
II. Goss v. LOPEZ
A. The Case
The Goss case reached the Supreme Court as an appeal from a
three-judge District Court ruling that the students had been denied
due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment be-
cause they had been "suspended without hearing prior to or within
a reasonable time thereafter."' The suit, brought as a class action
by nine named appellees, sought a declaration that the Ohio statute
permitting suspension of pupils for misconduct for up to ten days22
was unconstitutional. The appellants in the case, various adminis-
trators of the Columbus, Ohio, Public School System, sought rever-
sal of the three-judge panel on the grounds that the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not applicable to public
school suspensions because there is no constitutional right to an
education at public expense, or, in the alternative, that the loss of
17. Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951).
18. Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, supra note 14 at 157.
19. See note 3, supra footnote 8 of Goss v. Lopez.
20. See generally, Fiedler v. Board of Education of School District of Winnebago, 346
F. Supp. 722 (Neb. 1972); DeJesus v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (Conn. 1972); Voght v. Van
Buren Public Schools, 306 F. Supp 1388 (E.D. Mich 1969).
21. Lopez v. Williams, 372 F. Supp. 1279, 1302 (S.D. Ohio E.D. 1973).
22. Omo REv. CODE § 3316.66 (1972).
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up to ten days is neither a severe detriment to nor grievous loss of
liberty.13
The students in the case attended three different Columbus,
Ohio, schools. They were suspended for various reasons, including
"disruptive or disobedient conduct committed in the presence of the
school administrator," demonstrating in the school auditorium
while a class was being conducted and refusing to leave when so
ordered, physically attacking a police officer, and a lunchroom dis-
turbance which involved damage to school property.24 None of the
students was given a hearing to determine the operative facts under-
lying the suspension. One of the students testified that he was sus-
pended together with at least 75 others for the disturbance in the
lunchroom, but that he had not been party to the destructive con-
duct and was, in fact, an innocent bystander.2
B. The Majority Opinion
The Court rejected the appellant administrators' first argu-
ment that the due process clause was inapplicable because there is
no constitutional right to an education at public expense. The Court
reiterated the position it had taken in earlier decisions that:
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the States to deprive any per-
son of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Pro-
tected interests in property are normally "not created by the Con-
stitution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions defined"
by an independent source such as state statutes or rules entitling
the citizen to certain benefits."
Here, Ohio's statutory scheme directing "local authorities to pro-
vide a free education to all residents between six and 21 years of
age," and providing for compulsory attendance, created the prop-
erty right." The Court also found the suspension caused a depriva-
tion of liberty by including the student's reputation as part of that
concept: "'Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integ-
rity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,' the
minimal requirements of the clause must be satisfied. '28
Appellants' second argument, that a suspension of up to ten
days did not subject the student to a "severe detriment or grievous
loss" and thus did not require the protections of the due process
23. Goss v. Lopez, supra note 2 at 735-736.
24. Id. at 734.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 735.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 736.
1975]
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clause, was also rejected. Relying on Board of Regents v. Roth,29 the
Court reiterated the necessity of looking not to the "weight" but to
the "nature" of the interest at stake to determine whether due pro-
cess requirements apply. Continuing, the Court concluded that a
ten-day suspension from school is not de minimis and therefore the
due process clause applies.'"
Having found the due process clause applicable, the Court pro-
ceeded to decide the question: "What process is due?" Following the
precedents of Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy3 and Morrissey v.
Brewer,32 the Court found that at the "minimum students facing
suspension and the consequent interference with a protected prop-
erty interest must be given some kind of notice and afforded some
kind of hearing."33 Continuing the analysis of Cafeteria Workers and
Morrissey, the Court then examined and attempted to accommo-
date the competing interests involved. It found the student's inter-
est to be that of avoiding an unfair or mistaken exclusion from the
educational process with all of its unfortunate consequences. The
school's interest was identified as a need for an effective and flexible
disciplinary system. Although such an interest was found to be im-
portant, it was not strong enough to outweigh protection of the
student's interest. 34
The Court concluded by outlining the minimum requirements
necessary to satisfy the due process clause in school disciplinary
suspensions. A student threatened with a suspension of ten days or
less must "be given oral or written notice of the charges against him
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authori-
ties have and an opportunity to present his side of the story." 3 The
Court stated that "as a general rule notice and hearing should pre-
cede removal of the student from school."" They recognized, how-
ever,
[Tihat there are recurring situations in which prior notice and
hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a
continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of
disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed
from school. In such cases, the necessary notice and xudimentary
hearing should follow as soon as practicable .... 37
29. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
30. Goss v. Lopez, supra note 2 at 737.
31. Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
32. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
33. Goss v. Lopez, supra note 2 at 738.
34. Id. at 739-740.
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The majority opinion characterizes the requirements for notice
and hearing in its concluding statements:
In holding as we do, we do not believe that we have imposed
procedures on school disciplinarians which are inappropriate in a
classroom setting. Instead we have imposed requirements which
are, if anything, less than a fairminded school principal would
impose upon himself in order to avoid unfair suspensions.3
C. Justice Powell's Dissent
The dissent disagrees with this characterization of the majority
opinion in emphatic language. Mr. Justice Powell, writing for the
dissent,39 warns that "the decision unnecessarily opens avenues for
judicial intervention in the operation of our public schools that may
affect adversely the quality of education."40 He concludes: "No one
can foresee the ultimate 'thicket' the Court now enters. Today's
ruling appears to sweep within the protected interest in education
a multitude of discretionary decisions in the educational process.",'
Justice Powell reasons that "a student's interest in education
is not infringed by a suspension within the limited period prescribed
by Ohio law. Moreover, to the extent that there may be some argua-
ble infringement, it is too speculative, transitory and insubstantial
to justify imposition of a constitutional rule."42 He articulates three
major criticisms of the majority opinion. First, he finds a misreading
of the cited precedents. It is his contention that a "severe detriment
or grievous loss" is required in order to trigger due process protec-
tions.43 Second, he argues that "wide latitude with respect to main-
taining discipline and good order" is necessary for daily operation
of public schools." Finally, he claims that the proper role of the
judiciary is one of limited supervision of public education.' Justice
Powell fears the institution of due process requirements into short-
term suspensions will ultimately inject an adversarial atmosphere
into the educational process.46 He cautions that future courts follow-
ing the rationale articulated in the majority opinion may decide
that a school's grading practices, promotion policies, requirements
for participation in extra-curricular activities, or grouping decisions
38. Id.
39. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Blackmun, and Mr. Justice Rehnquist joined former
school board member Mr. Justice Powell in his dissent.
40. Goss v. Lopez, supra note 2 at 741.
41. Id. at 747.
42. Id. at 742.
43. Id. at 743.
44. Id. at 744.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 746.
1975] 339
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must also satisfy due process procedures. 7
Justice Powell's criticisms and fears are reminiscent of those
expressed by adherents of the counseling rationale manifested in the
university discipline of the pre-Dixon era, or those held by oppo-
nents to the extension of due process protections to juvenile offend-
ers rejected by the Court in In re Gault.4" One commentator's obser-
vations about the Gault decision are equally applicable to Goss:
"The Court also demonstrated that a desire to help-the
rehabilitative ideal-no longer will serve as the incantation before
which procedural safeguards must succumb."49 Unlike Justice Pow-
ell, the majority in Goss recognizes "a benevolent purpose too often
is a mask for arbitrary procedures."5 ° Such arbitrary procedures can
occur with equal frequency in either the high school discipline pro-
cess or the juvenile court.
III. IMPACT IN MONTANA
Present Montana statutes on suspensions and expulsions are in
no conflict with the Goss decision." The individual policies adopted
by various Montana school districts may, however, have to be
changed to meet the decision's requirements. Conversations with
several Montana educators would indicate that at least some school
districts not only meet these requirements, but in fact have insti-
tuted stricter policies in order to provide more protection for their
students .5
Precisely what does Goss require of schools? The case suggests
the following considerations for school policies:
I. Scope. Goss requires due process procedures in only three kinds
47. Id. at 747-749. Mr. Justice Powell reiterates this warning in his dissent from Part n9
of Wood v. Strickland, -. U.S. , 95 S.Ct. 992,1004 (1975) at n.3.
48. In Re Gault, supra note 5.
49. Cohen, Fred. Sentencing, Probation, and the Rehabilitative Ideal: The View from
Mempha v. Rhay, 47 Tax. L. REv. 1, 4 (1968).
50. Id.
51. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, § 75-6109, 75-6113 (1947) give teachers or district
superintendants or principals authority to suspend pupils "for good cause." Section 75-6311
directs district trustees to "adopt a policy defining the authority and procedure to be used
by a teacher, superintendant, or principal in suspending a student and to define the circum-
stances and procedures by which the trustees may expel a pupil."
52. A telephone interview with Mr. Lou Gappmayer, principal of Bozeman Senior High
School, and personal interviews with Mr. Gene Leonard, Vice-Principal of Sentinel High
School and Mr. Dwight Hopkins, Vice-Principal of Hellgate High School during February of
1975 all revealed no need for their schools to make any changes in present suspension proce-
dures as a result of Goss. A telephone call to Mr. Carroll Blend, counsel to the office of the
Superintendent of Public Instruction for the state of Montana indicated that he has had some
inquiries on the decision, but foresaw no real impact on Montana. He was considering the
possibility of making some statement on the decision in a future copy of the monthly newslet-
ter sent to all public school employees.
[Vol. 36
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of actions: expulsions, suspensions, and other disciplinary mea-
sures of similar severity.
3
H. Procedure. In acting in any of the above matters, the school
must provide the student with notice of the alleged wrongdoing
and an informal hearing to consider the wrongdoing.
A. Effective Notice requires two steps:
1. Promulgation of school rules clearly stating what
behavior is expected of students."
2. Notification to the student wrongdoer stating which
rule he has broken. 55
B. Hearing. The hearing must give the student an oppor-
tunity, formally or informally, to discuss the alleged
wrongdoing. Prior to a suspension, the hearing must:
1. include the school's statement of the facts;
2. include the student's statement of the facts;
3. have both the student and the disciplinarian pres-
ent;"
4. take place before the school's action against the
student, unless the student's presence is a "continuing
danger" or "ongoing threat" in which case the hearing
must take place within 72 hours of the student's
suspension."
Prior to an expulsion, more formal procedures may be
required."8
53. Although Justice Powell makes a dire forecast of the eventual application of due
process requirements to other discretionary decisions such as grading and ability grouping,
(see Goss v. Lopez, supra note 2 at 747-748) such a conclusion is not readily apparent from
the limitations placed in the majority opinion by Mr. Justice White. His opinion speaks of
disciplinary decisions made in an educational setting, and not to the myriad of other decisions
school personnel must make. Certainly Mr. Justice Powell is not suggesting that grades are
or should be used as disciplinary measures. There is clearly a qualitative difference between
a decision to suspend or expel a student, and one to give him a poor grade or deny him a
class change. Goss applies to the former and not to the latter.
54. This requirement can be easily met by preparing a student handbook containing
all the school rules and policies which should then be distributed to all new students. Many
schools take time to cover their school rules in a new student orientation program, or in the
freshmen or sophomore English classes.
55. The Goss decision permits this requirement to be satisfied by oral or written notice.
Written notice would serve as a protection for the school in the event of a future challenge
based on the grounds of ineffective notice.
56. Although the Goss decision does not require that parents be present at the hearing,
many schools do permit parents to attend if they wish. The Goss majority also say that the
school official may wish to allow others at this hearing if the case is complex. Others who
might also attend, but whose presence is not mandatory are: "the accuser," "the student's
own witnesses," or "counsel for the student" (See Goss v. Lopez, supra note 2 at 741).
57. Goss v. Lopez, supra note 2 at 735.
58. Id. at 741. The more formal requirements which most likely would be necessary are:
written notice of the charges delivered to the student and parent in sufficient time to prepare
a defense, a minimum of two days, which informs the student of the regulation violated; the
evidence and witnesses the school will produce; a formal hearing before the board of trustees;
and assistance of retained counsel if desired. This hearing must take place before the student
is expelled.
9
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III. Penalty. If these procedures are not followed, the school offi-
cials involved may be subject to a suit for damages by the stu-
dent. 9
The due process procedures required by the Goss decision are
not excessive. Their uniform adoption by Montana schools should
guarantee that school discipline is administered with basic fairness.
There is no suggestion in the decision that the schools lack authority
to discipline. The Court emphasizes, however, that any discipline
administered must satisfy due process requirements. The erection
of these barriers against arbitrary decisions or mistaken conclusions
should serve not to break down rapport between school officials and
students, but to increase the respect that each group has for the
other.
59. Wood v. Strickland, supra note 47.
10
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